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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________ 
 
No. 19-1538 
____________ 
 
 
JAIME GONZALEZ; PATRICIA WRIGHT; KEVIN WEST; GERALD BOEHM; 
EDWARD MAAG; DIANE MAAG, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 
situated, 
   Appellants 
v. 
 
OWENS CORNING; OWENS CORNING SALES, LLC 
      
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-01378) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2020 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, RENDELL, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 1, 2020) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________
 
 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal is the final skirmish in a long legal battle over allegedly defective 
Owens Corning shingles purchased by Plaintiffs. The District Court initially granted 
Owens Corning summary judgment, but we reversed, and the parties later settled. 
Plaintiffs then requested attorneys’ fees, arguing their appeal of the Court’s summary 
judgment benefitted the putative class. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, and they 
appealed again. We will affirm. 
I 
 In 2006, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
confirmed Owens Corning’s Chapter 11 plan. See Gonzalez v. Corning, 885 F.3d 186, 
190 (3d Cir. 2018). Under the confirmation order and 11 U.S.C. § 1141, all “claims” 
against Owens Corning as of that date were discharged. Id. 
 At the time, our decision in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. 
Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Frenville”) supplied the legal standard for 
determining whether a plaintiff held a “claim” in bankruptcy. Under Frenville, courts 
looked to the underlying state limitations law to determine when a claim arose. See 
Gonzalez, 885 F.3d at 191 (citation omitted). “Thus, for example, a claim brought under 
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the law of a state in which the discovery rule applies arises when the claimant discovers 
the injury.” Id. 
 In 2009 and 2010, Plaintiffs Patricia Wright and Kevin West sued in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming Owens Corning 
manufactured defective shingles. See id. at 189; App. 177. They purported to represent a 
class of individuals who owned structures on which the shingles were installed. Gonzalez, 
885 F.3d at 191 (citing Gonzalez v. Owens Corning, 317 F.R.D. 443, 455 (W.D. Pa. 
2016)). Both Wright and West asserted state-law causes of action, and Wright—a 
Pennsylvania resident—asserted a cause of action under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PUTPCPL), 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1 et seq.; 
App. 99–110. Although Wright and West both installed their shingles before Owens 
Corning’s reorganization plan was confirmed in 2006, they did not discover the shingles’ 
alleged defects until 2009. See Wright v. Owens Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 
2012). Because they both resided in states in which the discovery rule applies, under 
Frenville they did not hold “claims” in 2006. See id. at 104 & n. 5. 
 In 2010, we overturned Frenville. See JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re 
Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Grossman’s”). Under 
Grossman’s, a claim arises when the claimant is exposed to the debtor’s product or 
conduct, no matter when the claimant discovers the injury. See id. at 125. Applying 
Grossman’s, the District Court granted Owens Corning summary judgment. It reasoned 
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that Wright and West had claims in 2006 and their claims had been discharged when the 
District Court confirmed Owens Corning’s reorganization plan. See Wright v. Owens 
Corning, 450 B.R. 541, 557 (W.D. Pa. 2011). 
 Wright and West appealed, and we reversed. Citing due process concerns, we held 
the Frenville rule applies to cases in which courts confirmed reorganization plans before 
we decided Grossman’s. See Wright, 679 F.3d at 109. Thus, we held Wright and West’s 
claims were not discharged. See id. 
 On remand, the District Court consolidated Wright and West’s case with three 
others, and Plaintiffs moved to certify a class. See Gonzalez, 885 F.3d at 189. The Court 
denied the motion, see Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. at 529, and we affirmed, see Gonzalez, 885 
F.3d at 203. The parties then settled. See Gonzalez v. Owens Corning Sales, LLC, 367 F. 
Supp. 3d 381, 383 (W.D. Pa. 2019).  
 Following the settlement, Plaintiffs moved for attorneys’ fees. See id. at 382. They 
argued that, under any of three theories—(1) the common fund doctrine; (2) the common 
benefit doctrine; and (3) the catalyst theory—they deserve “compensat[ion] for lifting the 
federal bankruptcy bar and voiding the bankruptcy injunction thereby creating a common 
benefit for millions of shingle owners.” Id. The District Court denied the motion, and this 
appeal followed. Id. at 387. 
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II1 
 We review the standards and procedures the District Court applied in determining 
attorneys’ fees de novo and the facts it found for clear error. See Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002). We also pay a “great 
deal of deference to a district court’s decision to set fees.” Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy 
Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 The District Court did not err in holding the common fund and common benefit 
doctrines do not apply. Both doctrines give courts discretion to award fees to attorneys 
whose work substantially benefits an ascertainable class of beneficiaries. See Polonski v. 
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 
524, 546 n. 44 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining the common benefit doctrine derives from the 
common fund doctrine). Plaintiffs suggest that our decision in Wright “reviv[ed] millions 
of warranties” and “prohibited [Owens Corning] from asserting the bankruptcy bar ab 
initio to avoid warranty claims.” Opening Br. 1; Reply Br. 4. But this description of 
Wright is unfounded. In Wright, we merely held that the Frenville rule applies to cases in 
which courts confirmed reorganization plans before Grossman’s. See Wright, 679 F.3d at 
109. So Wright benefitted only plaintiffs whose claims would have been discharged 
under Grossman’s but not Frenville. That class of plaintiffs is not ascertainable, because 
 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the Frenville analysis is so fact intensive. See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 145. Even if we could 
ascertain these plaintiffs, however, Wright benefitted them only by removing one 
obstacle to overcoming summary judgment—not by helping them prove their shingles 
were defective. Such a “minimal” benefit cannot support an award of fees under either 
the common fund or common benefit doctrine. Gonzalez, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 385–86; see 
also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) (holding common fund 
doctrine applies “only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice”); 
Polonski, 137 F.3d at 145–147 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 
(1970)) (explaining common benefit doctrine requires plaintiff to render a “substantial 
service” to an ascertainable class of beneficiaries). 
 Nor did the District Court err in holding the catalyst theory inapplicable. That 
theory gives courts discretion to award attorneys’ fees if a plaintiff’s litigation activity 
“pressured a defendant to settle or render to a plaintiff the requested relief.” Templin v. 
Indep. Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861, 866 (3d Cir. 2015). But see Buckhannon Bd. and Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001) (holding 
catalyst theory unavailable if statute has “prevailing party” requirement). In Templin, we 
held a plaintiff asserting claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) could pursue a catalyst theory, in part because ERISA's fee-shifting provision 
lacks a “prevailing party” requirement. See 785 F.3d at 864–66 (citing Hardt v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins., 560 U.S. 242 (2010)). Plaintiffs argue that because the PUTPCPL’s 
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fee-shifting provision also lacks a prevailing party requirement, they too should be able to 
pursue a catalyst theory. Even if the catalyst theory applies to the PUTPCPL, it cannot 
support an award of fees here. The catalyst theory requires “some degree of success on 
the merits.” Templin, 785 F.3d at 864 (citing Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254). But as the District 
Court concluded, Plaintiffs’ victory in Wright was purely procedural; it shed no light on 
the merits of any putative plaintiff’s claim. See Gonzalez, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 387. 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying the 
motion for attorneys’ fees. 
